Re: Hirsch versus Farnsworth
Posted: Tue Aug 05, 2003 1:33 pm
Answering some of Adam's questions.
Farnsworth was medically retired from ITT in 1966.
The project head then became Robert Hirsch.
The "fission business" was an ongoing thing in 1966 and was rather well developed and not just starting up. Though the bulk of fission plants were, indeed, built later. One of the big reasons Farnsworth was funded so long was that every now and then news of Farnsworth's fusion work was allowed to leak and ITT's stock always shot up like a rocket. The company liked that a lot.
Prior to 1964, the funding for the effort was meager and half hearted, but nonetheless, there. 1966 and 67 were the biggest budget years although I have been unable to obtain actual figures in writing. It was George Bain, alone, who had a rememberance of a 4 million dollar figure in the 66 budget that leaves any feeling at all for how much was spent. This might not sound like much, but back then it was a gang o' bucks. (Bain was the head of all project engineering and had a EE Masters degree) Right after Meeks, George Bain was the longest fusor team member in the effort (59-68).
The team actually had two really good years after Farnsworth was out. It was ITT that really wanted the effort shifted and paid for in future by the AEC. Why should they fund further work? They owned all the patents. Let the government pick up the tab. ITT would would just collect royalties. Alas, AEC turned it down for a number of reasons, mostly political. Bob Hirsch learned a cricial lesson here and this inducted him into the beltway politics of fusion. He was so eloquent in his fusion proposal with the fusor that within a year of his failed effort and shuting down of the Farnsworth effort, the AEC hired him! He was becoming a policticized scientist. He would ultimately get mild revenge in 4 years when he was placed in charge of Nixon's Thermonuclear program under the AEC and canceled a few fusion programs of those who refused him in 68. Regardless of some mis-steps while head of the ITER, he never lost his dream, even to this day of IEC fusion.
Farnsworth tried, abortively, to start PTFA, (Philo T. Farnsworth Associates), in Utah after 1967 and even dragged a few of his old fusor group out there with him in 68, only to abandon them and their families there having prodded them to join him and to leave ITT, pensions and steady work back in Fort Wayne. (ITT only fired Furth over the fusion debacle) All of the others, good technical people, were simply reassigned to other departments within the Fort Wayne facility. Only two of the original team would stay on at ITT and retire comfortably in the 1980's.
Farnsworth and Gene Meeks did have offices in Brigham Young University, but only Meeks actually performed useful work there as he and Dr. Andrew Gardner (department head) kept a fusor from the Fort Wayne period (loaned by ITT) working in the college until it was dropped from the program there in 1972.
So, Meeks was the first man in with Farnsworth in 1958 at his home on State Street in Fort Wayne where they did the earliest work at Farnsworth's personal expense all the way through the fully funded ITT effort and he was the "last man standing" at BYU when the fusor fires were dropped in 1972. This is why Gene is so critical to any full understanding of the work and effort regarding the fusor.
Sony did make a serious inquiry, but when Farnsworth couldn't obtain the patents from ITT and Sony saw the sad state of the abortive PTFA, they left the field.
Never a well man, Farnsworth never recovered from the 66 depression and died rather young and burned out in 1971. Pem, his wife, is still kickin'.
Books can never provide the full depth and breadth of the story and one could literally be written of the 58-72 period by itself, but instead of a scientific tale, would be more one of human drama and tragedy tangled in corporate and scientific politics.
Thus far, I feel and get the impression from all I have interviewed "to a man" that the "book writers" only interviewed them once and never really understood the scientific mission or had an interest in fusion at all. Paul was the exception, I feel, and that is why his book is the best, however, even Paul did not tell all. (blessedly so)
I was given a rather special status amoung the group as I was not just looking for a quick rinse. I could, of course, "talk shop" on the scientific, engineering and philosophical level. It didn't hurt that I had a working fusor, either. Therefore, I had a lot more told to me than a "one-shot interloper" looking to "do a book". All ofthe book writers focused sharply on the television period virtually to the exclusion of the fusion effort which many seemed to have relegated to a weak, half hearted effort, placing a rather negative stamp on the end of their magnum opus. Much of what I have been told has often been told in the strictest of confidence.
Richard Hull
Farnsworth was medically retired from ITT in 1966.
The project head then became Robert Hirsch.
The "fission business" was an ongoing thing in 1966 and was rather well developed and not just starting up. Though the bulk of fission plants were, indeed, built later. One of the big reasons Farnsworth was funded so long was that every now and then news of Farnsworth's fusion work was allowed to leak and ITT's stock always shot up like a rocket. The company liked that a lot.
Prior to 1964, the funding for the effort was meager and half hearted, but nonetheless, there. 1966 and 67 were the biggest budget years although I have been unable to obtain actual figures in writing. It was George Bain, alone, who had a rememberance of a 4 million dollar figure in the 66 budget that leaves any feeling at all for how much was spent. This might not sound like much, but back then it was a gang o' bucks. (Bain was the head of all project engineering and had a EE Masters degree) Right after Meeks, George Bain was the longest fusor team member in the effort (59-68).
The team actually had two really good years after Farnsworth was out. It was ITT that really wanted the effort shifted and paid for in future by the AEC. Why should they fund further work? They owned all the patents. Let the government pick up the tab. ITT would would just collect royalties. Alas, AEC turned it down for a number of reasons, mostly political. Bob Hirsch learned a cricial lesson here and this inducted him into the beltway politics of fusion. He was so eloquent in his fusion proposal with the fusor that within a year of his failed effort and shuting down of the Farnsworth effort, the AEC hired him! He was becoming a policticized scientist. He would ultimately get mild revenge in 4 years when he was placed in charge of Nixon's Thermonuclear program under the AEC and canceled a few fusion programs of those who refused him in 68. Regardless of some mis-steps while head of the ITER, he never lost his dream, even to this day of IEC fusion.
Farnsworth tried, abortively, to start PTFA, (Philo T. Farnsworth Associates), in Utah after 1967 and even dragged a few of his old fusor group out there with him in 68, only to abandon them and their families there having prodded them to join him and to leave ITT, pensions and steady work back in Fort Wayne. (ITT only fired Furth over the fusion debacle) All of the others, good technical people, were simply reassigned to other departments within the Fort Wayne facility. Only two of the original team would stay on at ITT and retire comfortably in the 1980's.
Farnsworth and Gene Meeks did have offices in Brigham Young University, but only Meeks actually performed useful work there as he and Dr. Andrew Gardner (department head) kept a fusor from the Fort Wayne period (loaned by ITT) working in the college until it was dropped from the program there in 1972.
So, Meeks was the first man in with Farnsworth in 1958 at his home on State Street in Fort Wayne where they did the earliest work at Farnsworth's personal expense all the way through the fully funded ITT effort and he was the "last man standing" at BYU when the fusor fires were dropped in 1972. This is why Gene is so critical to any full understanding of the work and effort regarding the fusor.
Sony did make a serious inquiry, but when Farnsworth couldn't obtain the patents from ITT and Sony saw the sad state of the abortive PTFA, they left the field.
Never a well man, Farnsworth never recovered from the 66 depression and died rather young and burned out in 1971. Pem, his wife, is still kickin'.
Books can never provide the full depth and breadth of the story and one could literally be written of the 58-72 period by itself, but instead of a scientific tale, would be more one of human drama and tragedy tangled in corporate and scientific politics.
Thus far, I feel and get the impression from all I have interviewed "to a man" that the "book writers" only interviewed them once and never really understood the scientific mission or had an interest in fusion at all. Paul was the exception, I feel, and that is why his book is the best, however, even Paul did not tell all. (blessedly so)
I was given a rather special status amoung the group as I was not just looking for a quick rinse. I could, of course, "talk shop" on the scientific, engineering and philosophical level. It didn't hurt that I had a working fusor, either. Therefore, I had a lot more told to me than a "one-shot interloper" looking to "do a book". All ofthe book writers focused sharply on the television period virtually to the exclusion of the fusion effort which many seemed to have relegated to a weak, half hearted effort, placing a rather negative stamp on the end of their magnum opus. Much of what I have been told has often been told in the strictest of confidence.
Richard Hull